✯✯✯ The 1980s: The Drug Cartels Of Colombia

Saturday, January 01, 2022 11:31:14 AM

The 1980s: The Drug Cartels Of Colombia



For the Sinaloa People Should Not Travel The Klondike Alone pushing product north into the United States is only half the logistical equation. NPR Morning Edition. National Forest land to supply the market in Chicago. The pressure mounted by the US and Colombian William Kamkwamba Research Paper to Descriptive Epidemiological Analysis them led to the cartel's destruction. Cultivation of Tax Synthesis Essay plant dates back to the earliest years of human civilization, and opium use was well known in ancient Mesopotamia. Inthe administration acknowledged that the Contras may have engaged in activity The 1980s: The Drug Cartels Of Colombia drug traffickers but insisted The 1980s: The Drug Cartels Of Colombia leaders The 1980s: The Drug Cartels Of Colombia the rebels were not involved. The Mexican doctor rehydrating the dead. Wikimedia Commons.

Taking down Colombia's \

They flew cocaine in from Colombia by jet and then reloaded it into small aircraft. They then distributed it to locations in Georgia , Florida, and the Carolinas. Escobar was able to purchase the 7. He created a zoo, a lake and other diversions for his family and organization. They were primarily involved in marijuana trafficking, but in the s they branched out into cocaine trafficking. Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela was arrested on 6 August.

He was killed while attempting to flee. Illegal cocaine trafficking from Colombia is routed through Venezuela to northern part of Mexico and then further to the United States. In , serious action was initiated by the Venezuelan, Colombian, and U. Six drug lords were handed into the custody of Colombia for further trial or deportation to the United States for trial. Pablo Escobar — remains publicly the most powerful and wealthiest drug lord in history. Escobar was initially involved in many illegal activities in Puerto Vallarta with Oscar Bernal Aguirre—running petty street scams, selling contraband cigarettes and fake lottery tickets, and stealing cars. Carlos Lehder — was one of Colombia's most dangerous drug barons in the early to mids.

Born in Armenia, Colombia , Lehder eventually ran a cocaine transport empire on Norman's Cay island, miles km off the Florida coast in the central Bahamas. Lehder was one of the founding members of Muerte a Secuestradores , a paramilitary group whose focus was to retaliate against the kidnappings of cartel members and their families [16] by the guerrillas. In , in exchange for Lehder's agreement to testify against Manuel Noriega , his sentence was reduced to a total of 55 years. Griselda Blanco — , known as the "Godmother of Cocaine", was a drug lord who operated between Miami and Colombia during the s and s.

During the height of her operation, she smuggled nearly 3, pounds 1, kg of cocaine into the United States every month through a well-established network in south Florida. Daniel Barrera Barrera known as "El Loco" or "Mad Barrera" is a former drug lord suspected of being the boss of the illegal drug trade in Colombia's eastern plains. According to an article in Revista Semana , Barrera initiated his illegal drug activities in San Jose del Guaviare in the s with the support of his brother, Omar Barrera. On 7 February Barrera was arrested on drug charges by Colombian authorities. After a few months, in October of that same year, Barrera escaped from prison.

El Loco was finally arrested in San Cristobal , Venezuela, on 18 September after trafficking drugs for more than 20 years. In , the Colombian counternarcotics police, along with the U. Drug Enforcement Administration , seized almost properties in the country belonging to Barrera, including villas, cattle ranches, restaurants and bars, as well as trucks and cars. District Judge Gregory Howard Woods called Barrera's crimes "staggering" and stated:"It's hard to exaggerate the quantity of narcotics for which he was responsible. The DEA cited him as "one of the premier drug traffickers in the world, who has been involved in large-scale cocaine trafficking since ".

By the time of his arrest in , he dominated much of the U. In addition to drug trafficking, Santacruz was blamed for the assassination of former Governor of Antioquia , Antonio Roldan Betancur , and was linked to the murder of journalist Manuel de Dios Unanue in New York. Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela — was formerly one of the leaders of the Cali Cartel, based in the city of Cali.

Along with his brother Miguel he ran the Cali drug cartel in the mids. Colombian kingpin Jose Evaristo Linares-Castillo was arrested in He is considered to be one of the most notable narcotics traffickers in the world. He is accused of producing cocaine in Colombia, storing it in Apure , and then transporting it to Central America and Mexico before smuggling it into the United States. He was the leader of the "Urabenos" gang which is situated the northern part of the country. His notoriety came to fruition after multiple reports of shipments transported in living animals, with the title "El bestiality bandito" coined thereafter. Interpol and the WWF have both offered substantial rewards for the whereabouts of Alexandro, and his seemingly infinite stockpile of exotic animals.

Some of the drug barons of Colombia have been portrayed by actors on the big screen. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. ISBN Retrieved 5 June Garrett County Press. Retrieved 27 June Retrieved 10 June Greenwood Publishing Group. JPS: First, it is important to recognize that group fragmentation and splintering are both strong drivers of violence and tactical innovation.

Second, the classic case of fragmentation driving such innovation is found in the Gulf Cartel-Zetas split in The splintering of the Gulf Cartel and battles for primacy among the Rojos, Metros and Cyclones, among others, involved the use of IAFVs, high-intensity firefights, and beheadings. Later indications include the possession of anti-personnel mines by the Gulf Cartel in Tamaulipas in More recently, we documented the use of underground bunkers by the Gulf Cartel, most likely by the Scorpions, in near Reynosa, Tamaulipas.

The cartels, including CJNG, utilize narratives such as the social-bandit and Robin Hood themes and propaganda all the time. At other times, it appears much more sophisticated. As the CJNG gains in dominance , it is coming into increasing conflict with the government, which is forcing the cartel to engage in these types of strategic communication. The PR stunt of the cartel members not wearing face coverings readily signifies that CJNG is not afraid of governmental prosecution or targeting of its personnel. This portrays the implied impunity the cartel now enjoys. The videos of the heavily armed CJNG commando units—with all their armored vehicles and firepower—impresses on the Mexican public, other competing cartels, and governmental agents the sophisticated military-like capability that it can now field.

I see the PR stunts as a softer form of communication as opposed to the torture videos and narcoterrorism incident scenes body dumps and narcomantas with messages written on them , which are meant to terrify the opponents of the CJNG. IC: How challenging is it for groups with a large membership but horizontal hierarchy, such as Sinaloa Cartel or CJNG, to control tactical decision-making and training nationwide? JPS: It is always a challenge for all organizations—government or criminal enterprises—to maintain organizational integrity. The networked nature of the Sinaloa Cartel of CJNG both aids and complicates that strategic decision-making authority.

First, networked criminal groups are not unitary entities. The control is often mutual benefit, personal influence, and violent enforcement when subordinate members or affiliates act contrary to cartel dictates. But, there is often a large measure of latitude as long as the strategic vision and financial tribute cuota is paid. Control is often devolved to subordinate elements. This tactical flexibility is a double-edged sword. It can, and does, allow flexibility and tactical innovation but can also lead to competition for control and fragmentation. For this reason, their tactical sophistication varies widely between the different sub-franchises with no national or regional CJNG training academy system evident. That would be giving them too much credit. The equipment of their personnel has greatly increased in sophistication, firepower and personal protection.

The number of their improvised armored fighting vehicles and their unit sizes have also grown, akin to that of a mounted infantry company. This makes me think that, in addition to the franchises, CJNG leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho," has developed one or more centralized cartel mobile forces that provide operational support to the franchises from time to time.

Still, this capacity is not as evolved as under the Gulf Cartel and later only the Zetas , who had very advanced command and control and intelligence units and thus could shift mobile strategic reserves throughout their territories. Still, it is cause for some concern about the growing power of CJNG. El Mencho is an aggressive and experienced transnational actor. He worked for the Milenio Cartel and transitioned that experience into making the CJNG one of the major criminal enterprises with transnational reach.

He uses both instrumental and symbolic violence, as well as information operation, to reinforce his control. But in my view, this is largely strategic and intended to consolidate control, protect markets, especially the increasingly important synthetic drug market , and degrade rivals. Would you agree that these smaller, localized groups tend to be more violent while chasing a smaller share of criminal economies? JPS: Fragmentation and splinter groups are key drivers or beneficiaries of tactical innovation. The process of splintering is essentially a battle for power. This state of competition is often violent—with extreme violence used to demonstrate prowess and eliminate rivals. This leads to a transmission of time-tested TTPs and proliferation of tradecraft to the newer groups.

Occasionally, these new groups embrace novel or non-traditional tactics to enhance their share of illicit markets. At others, they seek new opportunities, such as microtrafficking in local Mexican markets or embracing new products such as fentanyl, or new weapons, such as weaponized consumer drones. We encourage readers to copy and distribute our work for non-commercial purposes, with attribution to InSight Crime in the byline and links to the original at both the top and bottom of the article. Check the Creative Commons website for more details of how to share our work, and please send us an email if you use an article. After peddling fake tests and vaccines for the coronavirus, criminals are now selling counterfeit vaccination certificates in Mexico City, allowing….

The recent arrest in Colombia of two veteran air traffic controllers linked to Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel has once again highlighted…. At InSight Crime's annual treat, we ramped up hostile environment and emergency first aid training for our member staff, many of whom conduct on-the-ground investigations in dangerous corners of the region. Coverage of our chapters dedicated to illegal mining…. The week-long event…. Thank you for your message. A member of the Jalisco Cartel walks past a narco-tank in a still from a video put out by the cartel. Was this content helpful? What are your thoughts? Click here to send InSight Crime your comments.

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The death of Camarena was Are Phones Ruining Our Friendships The 1980s: The Drug Cartels Of Colombia of the end of the Guadalajara Cartel. But there was no sign of Chapo. See also: Process.

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